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Abstract
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Policy Research Working Paper 5807
This paper presents a dynamic model of the reinsurance 
market for catastrophe risks. The model is based on 
the classical capacity-constraint assumption. Reinsurers 
choose every year the quantity of risk they cover and the 
level of external capital they raise to cover these risks. 
The model exhibits time dependency and reproduces 
a market dynamics that shares many features with the 
real market. In particular, market price increases and 
reinsurance coverage decreases after large shocks, and a 
series of smaller losses may have a deeper impact than 
one larger loss. There is a significant oligopoly effect 
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effort by the World Bank to provide open access to its research and make a contribution to development policy discussions 
around the world. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The author 
may be contacted at hallegatte@centre-cired.fr.
reducing reinsurance supply, and the market is segregated 
into strategic large actors that influence market prices 
and price-taker smaller firms. A regulation trade-off 
between market efficiency and resilience is identified and 
quantified: improving the ability of the market to cope 
with exceptional events increases the cost of reinsurance. 
This model provides an interesting basis to analyze 
further capacity needs for the insurance industry in view 
of growing worldwide exposure to catastrophic risks and 
climate change.
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1 Introduction
Over the last 50 years, insured losses caused by natural disasters have followed an increasing
trend.1 Population increase and economic growth on the one hand, the development of insurance
markets on the other hand, have expanded the global insurance industry. In the future, continued
growth and development in at-risk zones and possible changes in climate are likely to maintain or
amplify this trend. This evolution would represent a signiﬁcant challenge for the insurance industry
(Herweijer et al., 2009). Reinsurance ﬁrms are particularly exposed to these issues as they supply
disaster coverage to insurance companies for hurricanes, windstorms or earthquakes, among others.
The reinsurance market resilience is a concern for the insurance sector. In particular, insurers
need to assess the ability of the reinsurance sector to absorb large shocks. More speciﬁcally, they
need to know how important losses impact the reinsurance market capacity, reinsurance prices
and the time needed for the sector to recover.2 From a public policy perspective, one may ask
if a modiﬁed solvency regulation increases the system resilience, and how it impacts the market.
Resilience is a key issue in the ﬁnance industry in general. It has been raised again following the
ﬁnancial crisis, as the ability of the ﬁnancial markets to withstand shocks has been questioned. The
economic literature has examined the question of regulations for ﬁnancial industries and especially
insurance industry (see Plantin and Rochet (2007) for a review). Our study focuses on the speciﬁc
case of the robustness of the reinsurance market to large shocks but its conclusions are of interest
for the ﬁnancial sector in general.
In this paper, we analyze the impact of important catastrophic losses on the reinsurance market,
using a dynamic model of the reinsurance sector based on a solvency constraint for reinsurance
ﬁrms. We thus enrich Winter (1994) ﬁrst dynamic model of the competitive insurance market. This
solvency constraint is represented by a bounded probability of default, and the model is related to
the classical capacity constraint hypothesis. Furthermore, we take into account the strategic eﬀects
of ﬁrms individual behavior on the market equilibrium, completing the traditional competitive view
of the insurance industry (Hardelin and Lemoyne de Forges, 2009).
Model results show a market dynamics that reproduces many real-world observations, sug-
gesting that the capacity-constraint hypothesis is able to explain the observed variability in rein-
surance prices and quantities, provided that strategic behavior is taken into account. We ﬁnd
path-dependency, i.e. the fact that the consequence of a one shock depends on previous years
losses and reinsurers response. We characterize and quantify the resilience of the sector through
the time necessary to restore reinsurance capacity after large disasters. We provide a sensitivity
analysis of the key parameters including higher loss levels and series of losses. We show that
improving the ability of the reinsurance market to cope with large losses and reducing reinsurer
default probability  that is consolidating reinsurance ﬁrms with regard to risk  has a cost,
due to its negative impact on market prices and capacity. Thus we exhibit a regulation trade-oﬀ
between market resilience and eﬃciency.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 brieﬂy describes the main characteristics of the
reinsurance market for natural catastrophe risks. Section 3 presents the underlying economic
1See Munich Re's long-term statistics: http://www.munichre.com/en/ts/geo\_risks/
natcatservice/long-term\_statistics\_since\_1950/default.aspx
2Capacity refers to the term used by Cummins et al. (2002) and deﬁned as follows: For any losses for which
the reinsurance companies are liable, the capacity of the reinsurance market is the proportion of the liabilities that
is deliverable to their customers, given the ﬁnancial resources of the companies, and all their risk management
arrangements (retrocession, catastrophe bonds).
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model and its main assumptions and limits. Section 4 describes the modeling approach and details
the data used for the calibration. Section 5 proposes a reference scenario and compares it with
the stylized facts described in the literature. Section 6 provides a sensitivity analysis on model
parameters. Section 7 discusses the regulation trade-oﬀ beween eﬃciency and resilience. Section 8
concludes.
2 The reinsurance market for natural catastrophes - An overview
The reinsurance market is a relatively small market compared to the insurance industry. Its
capitalization, all lines included, was estimated at the end of 2008 at $309 bn (Aon-Benﬁeld,
2009). As underlined by Plantin (2006), the demand for reinsurance can be explained from two
diﬀerent points of view. Reinsurance can be used by insurance companies as a risk management tool
(Borch, 1962; Blazenko, 1986; Lewis and Murdock, 1996; Froot, 2001; Froot and O'Connell, 2008)
or from a capital structure perspective (Doherty and Tinic, 1981; Mayers and Smith, 1990; Garven
and Tennant, 2003). In the speciﬁc case of natural disasters insurance, the role of reinsurance is
actually threefold: (i) reinsurers provide insurance companies with additional capacity, thereby
making it possible for them to increase insurance supply; (ii) reinsurance allows for a worldwide
mutualization of losses, thus reducing the cost of risks; and (iii) reinsurers provide an expertise on
the risks supported by insurers. This third aspect is particularly important for insurance companies
of medium and small sizes, which do not always have access to suﬃcient knowledge on disasters
risks.
The reinsurance market for natural catastrophe risks is a peculiar market as described in Froot
(2001) and Cummins and Trainar (2009). Contracts, referred to as treaties, are passed between
a ceding insurer, called the cedant, and the reinsurance company. They determine the covered
portfolio, the underlying risk and the level of coverage. For natural catastrophes coverage, the
most common contracts are excess-of-loss treaties based on non-proportional reinsurance.3 The
cedants transfer a layer of the risk from a deﬁned portfolio to the reinsurer at a contractually
deﬁned price. A layer is deﬁned by a deductible (the risk remaining at the charge of the insurance
companies) and a limit (that is the maximum indemnity that can be paid by the reinsurance
companies). For example, an insurer gets coverage for a property portfolio exposed to hurricanes
with a treaty of $20 million in excess of $5 million. In this case, if an event (deﬁned in the contract)
occurs causing a loss of $12 million, $7 million will be paid by the reinsurer. If an event causes losses
amounting to more than $25 million, the reinsurer only pays $20 million to the cedant. Typically,
a cedant builds a reinsurance program, dividing coverage among diﬀerent reinsurers even for the
same layer of the risk, thus diversifying its exposure to each reinsurer, and taking into account its
quality (for instance its default risk, its claims management system, etc.). Note that there is no
standardized market for such risks, and data on these contracts are diﬃcult to obtain.
To model the ability of the reinsurance industry to withstand large disasters, a good under-
standing of its speciﬁcities is necessary. Numerous contributions see a limited systemic risk from
disasters in the sector, as mentioned by the reports of The Group of Thirty (2005) and The Geneva
Association Systemic Risk Working Group (2010). But even if capital depletion in the reinsurance
industry does not increase the risk of default signiﬁcantly, it has however an important impact
3Other types of reinsurance contracts are described in Cummins and Trainar (2009).
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on reinsurance prices (Guy Carpenter, 2009) and thus on the capacity of insurance companies to
maintain the same level of coverage. As a consequence, it impacts signiﬁcantly insurance prices
and the wider economy.
Several market characteristics have to be taken into account to understand better this mecha-
nism which is complicated by the entangled aspect of the reinsurance market and its opacity. First,
the market has a small number of participants who share a lot of business risks (exposition to large
disasters, asset risks). Second, the reinsurers may themselves use retrocession, i.e. they transfer
part of their risk to other companies.4 Third, the reinsurance market is characterized by several
market imperfections that explain the limited use of reinsurance. Indeed, the market volume of
the global reinsurance market is quite low compared to the insurance one, and the price of rein-
surance has been found quite high, up to several times the actuarial price (the expected loss of the
underlying risk's distribution). Market imperfections, as listed by Froot (2001), include important
frictional costs linked to the illiquidity of reinsurance treaties; moral hazard (Bohn and Hall, 1999;
Doherty and Smetters, 2005); adverse selection (Cutler and Zeckhauser, 1999; Jean-Baptiste and
Santomero, 2000); interventions on the reinsurance market by third-parties, from disaster reliefs
of all forms to state guaranty funds (Bohn and Hall, 1999); and agency issues. However, K. Froot
underlines two aspects of the market that are particularly important: (i) capital market imperfec-
tions that lead to capacity shortage; and (ii) reinsurance market power. Our modeling exercise is
built on these two mechanisms.
Another characteristic of the industry is the time-variability of prices and capacities, which is
often referred to as a cycle (Meier, 2006). A large literature exists on the reinsurance cycle, on
which a review has been conducted by Weiss (2007). It provides a wider theoretical analysis of the
dynamics of insurance and reinsurance markets. Thus, reinsurance prices are high during hard
market and low during soft markets. Even if this denomination of cycle is debated (Kessler, 2005),
the special role of disasters is noted as they may induce an important depletion of capacity (Weiss,
2007). This hypothesis is reinforced by the observation of emerging transitory means for reinsurance
companies to gain access to additional capital after large shocks, like catastrophe bonds or newer
vehicles (Lane, 2007a; Cummins, 2008), or the emergence of new reinsurance companies as the
Bermudians (Lane, 2007b).5 Figure 1 represents the evolution of natural catastrophe reinsurance
price index (given by the rate-on-line) as well as new capital ﬂows into the natural catastrophe
reinsurance industry.6 A distinction is made between equity and IPO (Initial Public Oﬀering) 
in dark grey on the graph  and Insurance Linked Securities (ILS) as catastrophe bonds and
sidecars  in light grey on the graph. The impact of Andrew (1992), the World-Trade Center's
attack (2001) and Katrina (2005) can be observed. Following these losses, the price of natural
catastrophe reinsurance increases. There was also an increase of the ﬂow in external capital to the
market: $10 bn in 1992/93, $16 bn in 2001/02, and more than $35 bn in 2005/06 for the whole
industry (Guy Carpenter, 2009). The development of the ILS market can be seen on the graph
4Retrocession qualiﬁes the cession of risk by reinsurance companies to retrocession companies (i.e. other com-
panies devoted to retrocession or other reinsurance companies). The Group of Thirty (2005) estimate its volume at
10 to 15% of the reinsurance risk.
5Risk-linked securities enable insurance or reinsurance companies to transfer a share of their risks to the capital
market. Catastrophe bonds are deﬁned by Cummins (2008) as a fully collateralized instrument that pays oﬀ on
the occurrence of a deﬁned catastrophic event , side cars are.
6The rate-on-line corresponds to the reinsurance limit (that is the maximum indemnity that can be paid by the
reinsurance company) of a contract divided by the premium paid. It is an imperfect proxy for reinsurance prices,
but it is widely used in the industry.
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(see Cummins and Weiss (2009) for a review).
Figure 1: New capital ﬂows in the natural catastrophe reinsurance industry and reinsurance rates for
natural catastrophes.
Source: The Geneva Association Systemic Risk Working Group (2010)
Two types of models are used in the literature to analyze this cycle. The ﬁrst kind focuses
on the impact of capacity constraints on market prices (Gron, 1994). As Weiss and Chung (2004)
mentions, these models are particularly relevant for the study of extreme events impact on the
reinsurance market. The second kind is based on a risky debt hypothesis in which customers are
concerned about the liability of their insurance companies (Cummins and Danzon, 1997; Zanjani,
2002).
Our model builds on these analyzes to address the issue of natural catastrophe reinsurance ca-
pacity but proposes a diﬀerent approach and four main contributions. First, the model is dynamic
and can be used to estimate market resiliency to series of disasters. Existing companies resistance
to catastrophe losses is modeled. The time needed for the market to replenish itself is simulated.
Secondly, it allows for a better understanding of the impact of market imperfections on the rein-
surance supply. It takes into account the small size of the reinsurance market and particularly the
leading role of the few reinsurers with large market shares. The consequences of ﬁnancial market
imperfections are also scrutinized. Third, the validation of the model behavior compared to what
is currently observed allows for a discussion on the ability of the sector to adapt to increasing
exposure and losses, due to socio-economic drivers and climate change. Four, the model makes it
possible to investigate the costs and beneﬁts of regulation that aims at reducing reinsurers default
risk and increasing systemic resilience.
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3 The model
Our approach is similar to that of Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) models. It
is based on a succession of Nash equilibriums on the reinsurance market in which market conditions
depend on past losses and reinsurers' actions. Our approach shares common features with Winter
(1994) model of the dynamics of competitive insurance markets, especially the model recursive
form. But we extend this approach considering a solvency constraint (and no limited liability), an
oligopolistic market, and by providing long-term simulation of the market variables.
3.1 Reinsurance demand
Modeling the process of risk sharing between several insurers and reinsurers is diﬃcult. We
propose here a simple approach: we only consider one aggregate demand for reinsurance. This
demand consists of one catastrophe layer to be covered by the whole market. Each reinsurance
company provides supply for the coverage of a fraction of this layer. These assumptions, even
if they are restrictive, provide a tractable way to understand the reinsurance market. This is a
proxy since it does not distinguish between diﬀerent disasters and aﬀected regions, and between
risk layers.
We suppose that market demand is characterized by d(p), the share of the insured underlying
risk covered by the reinsurance market, in other words the fraction of the insured losses that are
transferred to reinsurers. This coinsurance factor only depends on the market reinsurance price p:
d(p) = d0 exp(−δp) (1)
For notational simplicity, the subscript t, which refers to time, is omitted in all equations. The
parameter δ characterizes the elasticity of demand to market price. The parameter d0 is such that
for an actuary fair premium pa, d(pa) = 1 and all insured losses are reinsured. The function d(p)
is decreasing and convex in p.
3.2 Reinsurance supply
We consider a market with NR reinsurance ﬁrms, indexed by r = 1, .., NR, that produce equiv-
alent goods Or. The variable Or is the amount of reinsurance coverage (in terms of coinsurance
factor) that is supplied to a unique global insurance market, i.e. to a continuum of insurance
companies. For example, in presence of insured losses L˜, reinsurer r will have to pay OrL˜ to its
customer insurers when losses are distributed homogeneously among reinsurers (see Section 3.4 for
details).
At the beginning of the period, each reinsurer has an initial wealth Wr that arises from the
capital issued in the past and accumulated surplus. This capital is costly to hold, even if it
corresponds to the accumulation of retained earnings.
At each period, the reinsurance company chooses Or. The reinsurer can also acquire some
external capital Er ≥ 0, if this additional wealth allows it to supply more coverage and to increase
the premiums it receives in such a way that it increases its proﬁts in spite of higher capital costs.
This new external capital is costly to raise on short notice (Froot and Stein, 1998). Also, the
reinsurer can reduce its wealth by Er < 0, through purchases of its own shares to shareholders.
This is the case if the cost of capital is larger than beneﬁts that can be derived from it in the
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reinsurance business.
Our model relies on a strong assumption of perfect information. Each reinsurer knows the
loss distribution perfectly. Then, when it decides the risk amount it covers, the external capital
acquisition and given an initial wealth, it is able to compute a ﬁnal wealth for all possible losses
and quantify its bankruptcy risk.
The probability of default piD of a given reinsurer is a key variable in our dynamic model. In
a nutshell, it represents the quantiﬁed risk that this reinsurer goes bankrupt, i.e. the risk that the
realized loss at this year added to all costs outweighs the sum of the capital and earned premiums.
We then make the following assumption: (A1) Reinsurers limit their default probability under
an exogenous below a limit pilim that corresponds to an exogenous solvency constraint, linked to
regulatory requirements.
Reinsurer's program
We model the reinsurance companies from a managerial perspective (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997).
We assume, therefore, that all reinsurers aim at maximizing the ﬁrm total proﬁts rather than
maximizing the return on equity. Proﬁts depend on the quantity of risk subscribed by the ﬁrm
and its price, the level of capital raised or bought back, and the initial wealth of the ﬁrm. Raising
additional capital allows for a decrease of the reinsurer default risk, and thus larger reinsurance
supply. The following equation deﬁnes expected proﬁts for one period of time (subscript t is
omitted).
EΠ˜r(Or, Er) = pOr − EL˜r + α(Er +Wr + pOr)− Sr(Er +Wr)− cr(Er,Wr) , (2)
where pOr is the reinsurer revenue from premium, and EL˜r is the expected loss reinsured by
reinsurer r (see Section 3.4 for details). Earned premium and capital (new external and initial
wealth) are invested at the risk-free rate α. Furthermore, there is a dead weight cost of raising
additional capital (Er > 0):
c(Er,Wr) = cr
(
Er
Wr
)2
. (3)
We assume that there is no cost for reducing the amount of capital through share purchase programs
and special dividend. The term Sr(Er + Wr) corresponds to the cost of carrying capital, where
Sr is the remuneration of capital asked by reinsurer shareholders. The diﬀerence (Sr − α) is the
corresponding risk premium. The model does not distinguish between the long-term cost of internal
and external capital.
A complete treatment of the reinsurers program at time t would involve the deﬁnition of an
expected actualized value function integrating the expected actualized proﬁts in following periods.7
Here, we propose a simple approach where at each period t, the reinsurance companies maximize
their expected proﬁts over one year, taking into account their solvency constraints. Moreover, a
limit is introduced on share repurchase and special dividend distribution.
7Indeed, the program could be written in a form recalling Bellman's equations. The problem could then be
broken apart following Bellman's principle of optimality, as the choice for (Otr, E
t
r) at period t can be separated
from all choices for further periods. Such a dynamic model is very diﬃcult to solve due to the recursive term of the
equation. Most of the time, it is resolved through linearization or at the stationary mode. However, our situation
can not be satisﬁed with such practices as (1) the equations of the valuation of the ﬁrm are quite complicated and
cannot be easily linearized, and (2) our interest resides in the analysis of the non stationary (non linear) dynamics
after great shocks that can deplete the ﬁrms from a large share of their wealth.
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Indeed, two situations can be encountered at time t:
• The reinsurance company is under-capitalized and thus is in a situation where the solvency
constraint is saturated. In such case, we consider that short term considerations overcome
the inter-temporal issues, and the optimization is done over one year only.
• The reinsurance company is overcapitalized at the beginning of the period and thus its
quantity choice is not restrained by the solvency constraint. If the reinsurance company only
considered short-term eﬀects at the beginning of period t, it would redistribute to shareholders
as much capital as it could, until the solvency constraint is saturated. However, the inter-
temporal part of the program gives an incentive to limit the redistribution to shareholders,
taking into account the value of keeping more wealth in case of losses in the years to come
or of better business opportunities in case prices increase. To represent these inter-temporal
eﬀects in a simple way, we assume that the quantity of capital that the ﬁrm can redistribute
over a year is limited.
This simpliﬁcation leads to the following assumption: (A2) Reducing the amount of capital
through share purchase and special dividend is restricted to a share κ of the reinsurer's wealth at
the beginning of the period.
From Assumptions (A1) and (A2), we consider that managers choose the quantity Or they
supply to the market and their level of external capital Er, in order to maximize their expected
proﬁt under their solvency constraint and the limit on the amount of capital they can redistribute:
max
Or,Er
EΠ˜r(Or, Er)
pidr ≤ pilim
Er ≥ −κWr
(4)
EΠ˜r(Or, Er) is the expected proﬁt of the ﬁrm detailed in Eq.(2).
3.3 Market equilibrium
At each period, we consider that reinsurance companies, under perfect information, maximize
their expected actualized proﬁt by choosing their reinsurance supply and their capital level, either
by raising new capital or buying capital back. We look for a Nash equilibrium where no reinsurer has
an interest to deviate from its choice of quantity and capital. We suppose here that (A3): reinsurers
compete in quantity. The equilibrium price is such that market demand equals reinsurance supply.
The demand is given by the inverse demand function d(p), where, at equilibrium, the aggregate
output of the industry is d(p) =
∑R
r=1Or(p). By deﬁnition, as Or correspond to the share of the
market risk layer covered by the reinsurance companies, we have d(p) ≤ 1. The equilibrium price
is such that market demand equals reinsurance supply.
The equilibrium is deﬁned by the following system at each period (subscript t omitted):
d(p) =
∑R
r=1Or(p)
∀r,

max
Or,Er
EΠ˜r(Or, Er)
pidr ≤ pilim
Er ≥ −κWr
(5)
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We solve this system by computing the ﬁrst order conditions. Details of the methods can be
found in the Appendix.
3.4 Model dynamics
At each period t, the model follows a series of steps. At the beginning of the period, each
reinsurance company is endowed with an initial level of internal capital W tr , derived from the
previous time step. Our model is dynamic and can be written in the following recursive form,
deﬁning the level of internal capital for all reinsurers at time t, W t = [W t1 , ..,W
t
R]:
W t+1 = f
(
W t, Lt
)
(6)
At time step t + 1, reinsurers' initial wealth depends on the wealth they inherited from the
preceding period t, and the loss Lt they incurred at the end of time step t.
Stage 1 Each reinsurer chooses simultaneously its market share and its level of capital to maximize
its proﬁt, under the constraint of market equilibrium. The market prices pt, reinsurer supplies
Otr, capital choices E
t
r, and default probabilities pi
d,t
r are determined.
Stage 2 Losses are realized following the loss distribution function. The ﬁnal wealth of all rein-
surers is computed as:
W t+1r = W
t
r + p
tOtr − Ltr + α(Etr +W tr + ptOtr)− Sr(Etr +W tr )− cr(Etr,W tr ), (7)
where Ltr is the amount of losses reinsured by the reinsurer r. We proceed in the following
manner: when losses are drawn at the end of each period, they are distributed randomly
among reinsurers. Each of them supports a loss:
Ltr = L
tOtr(1 + ˜), (8)
where ˜ is drawn in a normal distributionN (0, 0.5). When computing their default probability
and choosing their capital and quantities, reinsurers anticipate this random distribution of
losses. We deﬁne a bankruptcy event when a reinsurer wealth goes below a lower limit
threshold wealth at the end of the period. This is anticipated in the estimation of reinsurers'
probability of default.
Figure 2 summarizes the main steps of model computation.
Table 1 summarizes the variables and parameters of the model.
4 Materials & methods
4.1 Algorithm
For the resolution of the market equilibrium each year, we decided to use the trust-region-
reﬂective algorithm. This algorithm is a subspace trust-region method and is based on the interior-
reﬂective Newton method described in Coleman and Li (1994) and Coleman and Li (1996). Each
9
Reinsurers
Capital at t
Market Equilibrium
Expected
Losses
Reinsurers
choose
Or, Er
Market Price
pidr
Realized Loss
Final wealth
Possible bankruptcy
Going to t+ 1
Figure 2: Model timing schematics
Table 1: Variables and Parameters
Market variables
L˜ Distribution of market loss to be reinsured
pa Actuarial price of losses
pt Market price of reinsurance at time t
Market parameters
d0 Demand parameter
δ Price demand elasticity
α Rate of return of risk-free investments
pilim Limit probability of default
κ Limit percentage of capital that reinsurers can buy back
cr Cost of external capital
Sr Shareholder cost
Reinsurers' speciﬁc variables
r Reinsurer index
NR Number of reinsurance ﬁrms
W 0r Initial wealth of the ﬁrm
W tr Wealth of the ﬁrm at the beginning of time t
Etr External capital acquired by the ﬁrm at time t
Otr Share of the market risk covered by reinsurer r at time t
pid,tr Probability of default of the ﬁrm at time t
iteration involves the approximate solution of a large linear system using the method of Precondi-
tioned Conjugate Gradients (PCG).
4.2 Scenario
Reinsurance loss coverage
To build the insurance market demand for reinsurance, we proceed in the following manner.
We use model-based aggregate insured loss data from Risk Management Solutions Inc. for the
four main reinsurance disaster markets: Japan Earthquake, European Windstorm, US Hurricane
and US Earthquake, including four types of risk covered (agricultural, commercial, residential and
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business). We suppose that there are no correlations between losses in these markets.
For each line l = 1..4, we consider the industry-wide demand for coverage. We note L˜lI the loss
to which the insurance industry is exposed. Let us consider L˜l the demand for reinsured loss in the
lth line of business as a function of L˜lI . We suppose, at ﬁrst, that the insurance industry chooses
to cover losses for each line of business between a ﬁxed limit and a ﬁxed exhaustion point deﬁned
by their return periods, respectively T lL and T
l
E that deﬁne two level of losses L
l
min and L
l
max.
Ll =

0 for LIl ≤ Llmin, (9)
LlI − Llmin for Llmin < LIl < Llmax, (10)
Llmax − Llmin for Llmax ≤ LIl . (11)
This could be interpreted as if there was one layer of the risk that could be covered for each line
of risk. In practice, each reinsurer would deﬁne its own layers (limits and retentions) for each
risks. This allows the generation of a cumulative distribution function of potential reinsured losses
for the whole disaster market. In this version of the model, we assume that T lL = 10 years and
T lE = 300 years. We obtain the potential market for reinsured losses by looking at the aggregate
potentially reinsured loss distribution. We ﬁt this distribution with a log-normal distribution.
Figure 3 represents the obtained loss distribution, in billion of dollars. The stairs arise from the
limits and exhaustion points calculation. Expected loss is of $22 bn, standard deviation is $26 bn,
and maximum market loss is $568 bn.
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Figure 3: Distribution of market loss considered for reinsurance coverage.
This model of reinsurance demand is quite limited as reinsurance companies do not all have an
equal exposition to catastrophic risks (e.g. earthquake, wind etc...). However, we account here for
the main problem reinsurers have to address that is the covariance of the risks and the systematic
component of catastrophe risk. One limitation of our model is that we do not take into account
diversiﬁcation aspects as only one line of risk is considered.
5 Reference simulation: The oligopoly eﬀect
The reference simulation is a starting point to understand the main eﬀects reproduced by
the model as well as its limitations. It is based on an ﬁctive market in which all reinsurers are
identical. We consider a 50-year simulation with a scenario of annual market losses, assuming
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that the form of reinsurance demand does not evolve over time (it only depends on the price).
Each year, losses are randomly drawn from the distribution described above. For the purpose of
illustration, we introduced a 100-year loss at year 30 and use the same loss scenario for the whole
paper. No stochastic distribution of losses among reinsurers is carried out in this ﬁrst simulation,
and reinsurers incur losses proportional to their market shares (i.e.  = 0 in Equation 8).
The aim is here to understand the dynamics of the present market and check that the model is
able to reproduce a realistic dynamics. For these simulations, a bankruptcy event is deﬁned when
reinsurer wealth falls below 0.
Table 2 presents the values of the parameters used in this reference case. There are little data
available on most on these values in the literature. We base our reference parameters on the
available studies.8 The value of Sr is consistent with the magnitude obtained in Zanjani (2002).
9
The value of pilim corresponds to a return period of 200 years, which is used to calculate the level
of required capital in Solvency II.10 Concerning cr, we calibrated this parameter such that the
recourse to external capital following a high loss would be of a magnitude comparable with the one
shown on Figure 1, but without considering new insurers. Finally, available information concerning
share repurchase program are from Aon Benﬁeld (2010). Share repurchase are estimated at 2%,
peaking at 11% of shareholders fund for three of their reinsurance companies in the ﬁrst semester
of 2010. This cannot be used directly to calibrate κ, since most of these reinsurers are multiline,
but it provides orders of magnitude for this process. To assess the robustness of our results, a
sensitivity analysis is conducted on each of these parameters.
Table 2: Parameters
Parameters Reference simulation
elasticitya 0.2
α 4%
Sr 12%
cr 4.5 · 104
pilim 0.5%
κ 1%
aThe elasticity parameter is deﬁned as δ = elasticityEL .
We consider 5 reinsurers that each have an initial wealth W0 equal to $20 bn. Our reference
market can appear as highly capitalized but as reinsurers are monolines, there is no diversiﬁcation
eﬀects that can play here.
5.1 Simulation results
Results are presented on Figure 5 and commented below. All the graphs in this paper will
follow the same pattern. The diﬀerent output graphs are disposed following the order presented on
Figure 4. The black curves represent market variables, and the gray curves individual reinsurance
companies variables.
8Moreover most empirical studies are based on data that do not include years following Katrina.
9A more detailed analysis by Cummins and Phillips (2005) is focused on the insurance market.
10See http://www.gccapitalideas.com/2010/02/17/higher-pressure-on-cat-risk-under-solvency-ii-part-i-
standard-formula-approach/ for a CEIOPS discussion on Solvency II cat risk approach.
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The model reproduces a market showing many characteristics similar to those observed empir-
ically. In particular, prices are higher than actuarial prices, market capacity decreases after high
loss shocks, as the market price increases, and additional capital is raised by reinsurers after large
shocks. Since losses are distributed proportionally to market shares, the reinsurers remain identical
during the entire simulation (this assumption is relaxed in Section 6.2).
Graph 2
Graph 5
Graph 3Graph 1
Graph 6Graph 4
Figure 4: Output graphs layout
Graph 1: random reinsurance market losses scenario. The $90bn loss at year 30 corresponds
to a return period of about 100 years. From year 38 to 45, there is a cluster of several medium
losses.
Graph 2: market price of reinsurance as the ratio of price on expected loss. A price equal
to 1 corresponds to the expected loss. Market price always exceeds twice the actuarial price.
The price spikes after high loss events. Depending on the size of the shock, the time needed
to return to the lower prices is diﬀerent.
Graph 3: reinsurers' probability of default. The probability of default is capped by piLim as
our solvency constraint requires. After loss events, the solvency constraint is saturated until
market capacity has replenished itself.
Graph 4: market wealth at the end of the year. The total market capitalization (black curve)
is the sum of reinsurer capitalizations (gray curve). Each important loss is followed by capital
depletion. After the loss, the market rebuilds itself as capitalization rises. Time needed to
recapitalize depends on the intensity of the shock.
Graph 5: reinsurance supply. The gray curve corresponds to the risk covered by one reinsurer,
and the black curve to the risk covered by all the market. The total market supply always
remains below a ceiling value. This corresponds to an oligopoly eﬀect: serving a higher part
of the market would decrease the market price, and not be as beneﬁciary to the reinsurers.
As a consequence, reinsurers voluntarily ration the market to drive prices upward.
Graph 6: market external capital acquisition. The sum of all external capital movements
(black curve) corresponds to the sum of the identical individual reinsurers' external capital
movements (gray curve). At the beginning of the simulation, it is negative corresponding to
a purchase of reinsurer's own shares, as it is the case each time the solvency constraint is
not saturated. In such a situation, the market is overcapitalized. Most of the time, external
capital is positive and small, but after high losses it becomes much higher (year 15 and 31),
as well as in the middle of the series of medium losses (year 41).
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Figure 5: Reference simulation's outputs.
5.2 Market dynamics
This reference simulation allows the analysis of the path depende cy on the reinsurance market
dynamics.
Market behavior with regular losses: From year 1 to 30, losses are globally low and easily
absorbed by the market: the global market capacity is high. The risk served by the market
does not exceed 80%. The corresponding market price is low, but still twice the actuarial
price.11 The probability of default of the reinsurers is capped at 0.5%, until the reinsurers
have replenished themselves during soft markets. In such cases, external capital is slightly
negative, corresponding to share repurchase program. Higher losses, as the one that occurred
at year 14, lead to a rise in market price. Simultaneously, there is a large increase on the
acquisition of external capital that limits the correction on reinsurance supply, as is observed
in the market (The Geneva Association Systemic Risk Working Group, 2010).
Impact of a 100-year loss: The impact on the market of the 100-year loss, that happens here
on year 30, has three main characteristics. First, market capacity decreases brutally leading
to reduced reinsurance capacity. Consequently, the following year sees a double correction
from the reinsurers: they lower their supplies, and raise external capital ($12 bn here over
two years, that is one ﬁfth of amount of reinsured losses of the 100-year event). Their main
aim is to limit their probability of default that is capped here at 0.5%. Finally, there is a
delay of more than 7 years for the reinsurance industry to recover its initial capacity. At the
same time, the market price rises (80% rise). Note that we do not consider any change in
reinsurance supply or demand linked to a change in risk evaluation from either insurers and
reinsurers.12 Froot (2001) shows that after a large event, reinsurance coverage increases, but
with a bigger retention. Smaller events are then less covered. Further model development
11Transactions and administrative costs are excluded.
12This issue is explored in depth in Lai et al. (2000)'s model.
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will introduce a more sophisticated treatment of reinsurance demand.
Impact of a series of medium losses: From years 38 to 43, several losses occur, which have
a return period between 25 and 30 years. The market has no time to recover between
them. Therefore, market capacity remains low and reinsurance companies keep acquiring
external capital although in a limited amount. Market supply decreases to 50%, showing
the importance of considering series of shocks and introducing path dependency and the
dynamics of the market. This clearly indicates a path dependency in the market. This result
emphasizes the need to take into account possible clustering in extreme events, as suggested
by Bunde et al. (2005).
This reference simulation already exhibits some of the characteristics of the reinsurance market
dynamics. The main ones are (i) the rise of the price following an extreme event, (ii) the correlation
between market capacity and the price of risk, and (iii) the fact that reinsurers raise signiﬁcant
amounts of capital after large shocks. These eﬀects arise from the capacity constraint due to the
limit of 0.5% of probability of default. The high rise of the price after year 30 does not take into
account the impact of a change in reinsurance demand, nor of a risk reevaluation by reinsurance
companies, that Froot (2001) and Guy Carpenter (2009), among others, also mention to explain
market reaction.
5.3 Sensitivity analysis
Little data are available on the reinsurance market and there is a large uncertainty in all
model parameters. In such a situation, it is useful to carry out a sensitivity analysis to assess
the robustness of our results and to better understand important mechanisms. It is based on the
reference reinsurance-market scenario detailed above. We carry out sensitivity analysis on the main
parameters presented on Table 1. For each of those, we take varying values around the one used
in the reference scenario. Exact values and ﬁgures are presented in Appendix (Figures 11 to 15).
Results are the following:
Demand elasticity (e): The higher the demand elasticity, the lower the share of the market
covered after the large loss of year 33. This result is consistent with intuition: the increase
in prices after a large shock reduces reinsurance demand for insurers. For the year following
a high loss, higher elasticity leads to lower ex-post prices. It is in line with the economic
theory literature: Cagle and Harrington (1995) show that in the case of capacity constraint
and endogenous solvency risk (with limited liability) the increase in price after a shock with
inelastic demand price increases is lower than the amount necessary to oﬀset the shock. The
higher the elasticity, the lower the impact of shocks on prices. However, when considering
market recovery over several years, a lower elasticity leads to an earlier recovery of the market.
Cost of carrying capital (Sr): As can be expected, the higher the cost of holding capital, the
less capitalized the reinsurance companies are, and the less they are able to supply the
market. Hence, the equilibrium capital level (i.e. the stabilized level if losses are set to the
expected loss) depends on the cost of carrying capital. Following a large shock, external
capital acquisition is less important when the share cost is high.
Cost of external capital (cr): This parameters has a main impact after important losses when
the reinsurers acquire external capital. The lower the cost of external capital, the more the
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ﬁrms relay on it, and the less the market correction on prices. This leads to a higher capacity
of the reinsurance market to supply coverage after important losses when cost of external
capital is low. This impact is only visible during tight markets.
Impact of initial capital (W 0r ): In the present case with a perfectly symmetric market with no
entry nor exit, all reinsurers have an optimal capital target that they all tend to reach. A
diﬀerence in initial capital disappears after periods of soft market during which the reinsurers
can replenish their capital.
Impact of the number of reinsurers (Nr): When we distribute the same total capital among
diﬀerent numbers of reinsurers, the oligopoly eﬀect is quite clear: the fewer the reinsurers,
the lower market capacity and the higher the prices during soft markets. There is therefore
a clear gain from increased competition in the market. However, impact of important losses
lead to the same depletion of capacity.
Impacts of the solvency constraint (pilim): Results show that the lower the solvency con-
straint, i.e. the higher pilim, the higher the capacity of the reinsurance market in soft market
and the higher the time needed for recovery after an important loss. However, as path de-
pendency is important, a reﬁned analysis of the impact of this constraint, particularly on the
resistance to high shocks, is conducted in Section 7.
Impacts of the limit share of buy backs (κ): The sensitivity analysis shows that market cap-
italization stays higher over the scenario when κ is small, as ﬁrms can not buy back as many
shares as they would for higher level of κ. Consequently, market resilience to large losses is
higher.
6 Asymmetric market and reinsurer bankruptcy
6.1 Market segmentation between two sizes of reinsurers
To investigate a more realistic market, we build a ﬁctive reinsurance market from available
market data. The reinsurance market is characterized by a certain concentration that has increased
in the last decade. The current market involves big reinsurance ﬁrms such as Swiss Re and Munich
Re, smaller reinsurers, and new reinsurers as the Bermudian. However, as reinsurance companies
oﬀer coverage on several markets (life, disasters...), we do not have speciﬁc data on the capital linked
to disaster risks and on the market shares on the natural-disaster market. We use as a proxy the
market shares as obtained from Standard and Poor's (2008) on the reinsurance market for all lines
of risk: in 2007, the four biggest reinsurance companies accounted for 48 % of the market. We
consider a market with 4 large reinsurers that each have an initial wealth W0 of $22.5 bn, and 10
small reinsurers that have an initial wealth of $3 bn. This market is still ﬁctive, but it is consistent
with the type of concentration observed in the industry. The Geneva Association Systemic Risk
Working Group (2010) presents a concentration curve for the reinsurance market where the 10
biggest reinsurers share 80% of the market and the ﬁve biggest more than 50% in 2008. The
market parameters used are the same than in the reference reinsurance-market simulation. Figure
6 presents the results of this simulation. The smaller reinsurance companies are represented in
solid gray and the larger ones in dashed gray. The interpretation of the output graphs is essentially
the same as in the reference simulation. However, several interesting features appear due to the
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Figure 6: Fictive market outputs.
diﬀerence between large and small reinsurance companies. First, a higher number of reinsurance
companies are present on the market. Hence, the strategic impact of each of the ﬁrm is lower than
in the preceding case, and the oligopoly eﬀect is reduced. Consequently, the total share of the
market served by reinsurers is higher, up to 93%.
Small and large companies: Until year 30, our market is naturally segmented into (i) price-
maker big reinsurers, which have a strategic behavior and reduce their market share to drive
the price upward; and (ii) followers, which are price-taker and try to capture the largest
market share. Interestingly, small reinsurers have a saturated default probability most of the
time, contrary to the larger ones. This diﬀerence is due to their lower capitalization and the
lower impact of their decisions on the market price. Big reinsurance ﬁrms can indeed ration
the market by not providing the maximum supply they would be allowed to supply with
their capitalization. By reducing the amount of reinsurance they provide, they drive prices
upward, increasing their proﬁts. Small reinsurers do not have the same impact on the market
price, and they have an interest to capture as much of the market as possible, taking into
account their default probability boundary, making small reinsurers more vulnerable than
big ones to large disasters.
Convergence of the market With time, the diﬀerence between both capitalization levels de-
creases, as can be seen on Graph 6. This convergence is natural in such cases of repeated
Nash games as small reinsurers capture more and more of market shares until all reinsurers
converge to their optimal size for a market of 15 symmetric reinsurers.13
13Indeed, losses can be interpreted as a capital depletion on average. Simultaneously, we have increasing cost of
raising new external capital that can be interpreted as decreasing return to scale. Thus an optimal level of capital
for ﬁrms is quite classic.
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6.2 Reinsurers' bankruptcy
To take into account asymmetries among reinsurers, we include the stochastic distribution of
losses among insurers, as described in section 3.4. This allows to include reinsurer bankruptcy in
the model. The bankruptcy event is set here when reinsurers' wealth fall below a $0.5bn threshold,
that corresponds to bankruptcy costs. Figure 6 presents the results of a simulation with the same
parameters as above and the randomization of the losses. The additional graph below the others
represents the number of reinsurers on the market.
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Figure 7: Fictive market outputs with loss randomization.
Analysis of the graph's results are quite straightforward. Randomization of losses impact lessens
the convergence among asymmetric reinsurers, suggesting that the existence of multiple lines and
imperfect correlation of losses may explain the persistence of reinsurance of various sizes. Moreover,
path dependency is clearly seen on the graph. The impact of the huge loss at year 30 is globally
the same on the whole market: the price increases, total market supply is contracted, external
capital enters the market. However, when looking at all reinsurers, impacts are very diﬀerent
due to the randomization of loss impacts. Three reinsurers go bankrupt. Others, which are less
impacted by the loss, beneﬁt from the negative impact on the others, and grow more steadily
during the years following the shock, beneﬁting from the price rise following the shock and from
the increased supply they can provide. This corresponds to the intuition discussed by Cagle and
Harrington (1995) although they do not address it in their model. Of course, this is still a very
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simple representation of the real market, and a deeper study of the impacts of the market structure
would be of great interest.
The model allows to get a ﬁrst insight on the importance of market structure on the price and
capacity dynamics. Interesting results are obtained, as the model reproduces a segmented market
with both strategic and follower reinsurers that evolve through time depending on losses impact
on them. The former are large enough to have a real impact on prices and to reduce the amount of
reinsurance they supply to drive the price upward, especially in hard markets. The latter do not
have the same inﬂuence on the market, and behave in some ways as price-taker agents and beneﬁts
from the price driven by the other ones, as shown on the asymmetric idealized market.
One major insight from this article is the modeling of new capital ﬂows into the market. Two
diﬀerent kinds of ﬂows currently exist. First, there is a ﬂow of external capital in surviving
reinsurance companies, corresponding to equity emission or development of sidecars and catbonds.
Second, one can observe the development of new reinsurance companies when the reinsurance
market price is high (Lane, 2007b). The total of these two ﬂows is important. Following hurricanes
Katrina, Rita and Wilma, for instance, Guy Carpenter (2009) estimates that more than $35bn
were injected in the industry through these various alternative means of capital. This eﬀect has
taken more importance during the last decade, and impacts on prices have been less pronounced
since hurricanes Andrew (The Geneva Association Systemic Risk Working Group, 2010). Some
calibration is still needed to better assess ﬂows of capital in the market. The model presented in
this paper does only model the ﬁrst of these two ﬂows, namely the ﬂow of external capital into
existing reinsurers. A forthcoming version of the model shall include new reinsurers entry on the
market.
7 A regulation trade-oﬀ: Eﬃciency vs. resilience
Our modeling of reinsurer's risk aversion can be interpreted as a regulatory constraint: rein-
surers are not allowed to exceed an exogenous probability of default. This is of course a very
simple way to model insurance solvency regulations. Such a constraint has an impact on the mar-
ket behavior of the ﬁrms, as holding more capital to cover the same quantity of risk is costly for
the ﬁrms. On Figure 8, we represent the sensitivity analysis conducted on the symmetric market
for variations of the threshold default probability piLim between 0.1% and 0.9%. The impact of
this parameter on market variables is important. When the solvency constraint is strong (piLim
low), the share of total loss covered by the reinsurance industry is low, prices are high, and the
probability of defaults of reinsurers is saturated even in soft markets. As the limit probability of
default is lower, reinsurers need a higher capitalization to cover the supply they provide. Market
prices evolve correspondingly.
This sensitivity analysis suggests the existence of a classical trade-oﬀ between a higher market
resistance to large and rare shocks with more stringent regulation and an eﬃciency criterion in the
most frequent situations. Intuitively, a strong solvency constraint increases market resilience. But
simultaneously, it decreases market eﬃciency as holding the same amount of risk requires more
capital - and thus is more expensive. To understand better the impact of this solvency constraint,
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Figure 8: Sensitivity analysis for the solvency constraint
we ﬁrst studied the impact of a loss on the market price. To do so, we impose a large loss on a
stabilized market of 5 symmetric reinsurers, assuming they were exposed to the expected loss level
during the 10 previous years (to remove path dependency from the analysis). Figure 9 represents
the price in the year following the shock for the limit default probabilities 0.1%, 0.5%, and 1%.
This range is centered on a 200-year risk.
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Figure 9: Non linearity between price reaction and loss amplitude
We ﬁrst observe a non linearity between price and the magnitude of the loss. When the
regulation is stricter (lower limit probability of default), the price after small losses is higher,
because it requires more capital to supply the same amount of reinsurance capacity. So, the
market is most of the time less eﬃcient with a strict regulatory constraint. But after a large loss,
the market collapse with a weak constraint (e.g., for losses larger than $80 billion if the limit is at
1%), while the loss can be absorbed with a stricter regulation (however at the expense of a large
increase in price). Indeed, the highest loss the market is able to absorb is a market loss of $190
bn for a limit probability of default of 0.1% (1000-year loss), $110 bn for a probability of 0.5%
(200-year loss) and $80 bn for a probability of 1% (100-year loss).
A closer look at the impact of the default probability on the market is provided on Figure 10.
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On the typical scenario we used in Section 5, we compute the mean price and mean covered risks
on the market during the 50th years.14 We see again that average market price increases with the
regulatory constraint whereas correspondingly the capacity of the reinsurance market decreases.
Thus tighter regulation leads during a regular time period with limited losses to higher prices and
less available capacity for the same amount of capital. This is a typical example of an eﬃciency
vs. resilience trade-oﬀ as can be found in ecological systems.
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
50
60
70
80
M
ea
n 
to
ta
l m
ar
ke
t s
ha
re
 c
ov
er
ed
 (%
)
Limit default probability
 
 
2
3
4
5
M
ea
n 
m
ar
ke
t p
ric
es
 (m
ult
ipl
es
 of
 ac
tua
ria
l p
ric
e)
Mean Coverage
Mean Market Prices
Figure 10: Reinsurance price and market capacity in function of the limit probability of default
This analysis is of course quite limited for several reasons: (i) we only consider one line of
business for the reinsurers with only one capital charge; (ii) we only take into account shocks
that may arise on the liability side of the reinsurers balance-sheet while asset-side shock play a
crucial role; (iii) we disregard any potential correlation between ﬁnancial market risks and natural
disasters. Furthermore, the reinsurance industry reaction to shocks on their asset sides can induce
impacts on the ﬁnancial markets.
The justiﬁcation and the choice of a proper regulation is a diﬃcult question that Plantin and
Rochet (2007) analyze. Agency considerations and moral hazard issues are crucial: policyholders
are mostly very diluted and do not exert suﬃcient monitoring.15 Furthermore, the complexity of
the reinsurance business makes it very diﬃcult to assess the solvency risks linked to each company
for technical as well as moral hazard reasons. In this paper, we do not ask the question of the
optimal level nor the justiﬁcation of regulation as we do not consider any welfare perspective and
only look at the impact on the reinsurance market. But the eﬃciency/resilience trade-oﬀ in this
simple way provides a clear illustration of one of the key regulator issues: what is the acceptable
risk for such an industry and at what cost can it be hedged? This question is at the center of
regulation questions following the ﬁnancial crisis, especially following AIG's buy-out (Harrington,
2009). Certainly, the reinsurance industry does not have as much a macroeconomic impact as the
insurance industry, but its proper operation is an important condition for the insurance industry
to be able to still cover large risks.
14A proper analysis would require running the full model with loss randomization. This will be done in a further
version of the model.
15In the case of reinsurance companies, it could be argued that insurance companies could have the ability to
monitor them eﬃciently.
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8 Conclusion
The model outputs shed a better light on the way classical economic assumptions allow for
understanding and reproducing the reinsurance market dynamics. Compared with previous anal-
yses, our approach investigates the issues of reinsurance capacity to withstand important losses in
a dynamic framework. Our model relies on a capacity constraint analysis, with a threshold proba-
bility of default for reinsurance ﬁrms. This factor may enhance the role of regulatory measures on
the dynamics and the resilience of the reinsurance market either through the resistance to severe
losses or through the time needed for capacity replenishment. Furthermore, we take into account
the impacts of the ﬁrm choice on the market equilibrium to model potential strategic behaviors of
large reinsurers. Our approach is innovative as we compute a dynamics of the market, based on
these clear and tractable assumptions.
This analysis is only the ﬁrst step of a broader research agenda. Incorporating several lines of
risk will reﬁne the reinsurance demand model. A better calibration would allow a better under-
standing of the market features that inﬂuence the market resilience. Recent data on reinsurance
contracts would be needed to do so, and they are diﬃcult to access. The long-term objectives of
this model are to develop insights on the needed market capacity and to understand the insurance
industry limits in providing disaster coverage. This question is critical when considering the cur-
rent trends in insured and reinsured exposure. In addition to the classical economic trend issues
(Hallegatte, 2011), the IPCC (2007) suggests a probable rise in the frequency and intensity of some
natural disasters (e.g., storm surge and coastal ﬂoods). Several studies have proposed projections
of future exposure due to these trends (see for instance Hanson et al. (2011) on the exposure in
coastal cities) and the consideration of diﬀerent scenarios will be necessary. How could the rein-
surance industry be able to cover increasing risks, and how could speciﬁc policies and regulations
enhance its ability to do so?
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A.1 Market Equilibrium Resolution
Intuitively, two situations shall be distinguished for modeling for each reinsurer whether its solvency
constraint is saturated or not. First, in the saturated case, the choice of external capital Er is an implicit
function of the choice of supply Or through the solvency constraint.
16 The equilibrium constraint is
then equivalent for the concerned reinsurers to the maximization of their expected proﬁt as a function of
reinsurance supply only.
16In practice, due to the form of the capital costs, there may be two solutions Er to this constraint that lead to
the same expected proﬁts. In this case, we take the lower level of capital Er as it gives the highest yield.
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(1 + α)
(
∂p(O1,...,OR)
∂Or
Or + p(O1, ..., OR)
)
− ELr −
(
∂c(Er)
∂Er
+ (Sr − α)
)
∂Er
∂Or
= 0 (12)
In the case where the constraint is not saturated, the choices of external capital and reinsurance
supply are not linked any more. The ﬁrst order conditions for the concerned reinsurers are composed of
two diﬀerent elements: (FOCO) determining the reinsurance supply choice and (FOCE) determining the
external capital level that corresponds to the exogenous limit for reducing the amount of capital through
share purchase programs and special dividend.
(1 + α)
(
∂p(O1,...,OR)
∂Or
Or + p(O1, ..., OR)
)
− ELr = 0 (FOCO)
Er = −κWr (FOCE)
(13)
A.2 Sensitivity analysis
Sensitivity analyses are conducted on key parameters. Parameters are changed individually from the
reference reinsurance-market scenario. The order of the graphs is the same as for the reference simulations.
To be able to better read the results, a shorter time period is shown for each analysis, depending on the
parameter considered.
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Figure 11 presents the sensitivity analysis for the elasticity of demand. The elasticity parameter
e = EL ∗ δ (0.2 corresponds to a low elasticity, and 0.6 to a high demand elasticity with respect to price.
Note that for a low elasticity, pale gray, reinsurers buy share back much more frequently since price and
quantity can be large together.
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Figure 11: Sensitivity analysis for elasticity
Figure 12 presents the sensitivity analysis for the cost of carrying capital. The parameter Sr, which
represents this cost, varies from 10% to 14%.The model is sensitive to this parameter, but qualitative
results remain unchanged.
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Figure 12: Sensitivity analysis for sharecost
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Figure 13 presents the sensitivity analysis on the initial capital of the ﬁrms. After 10 years, all simu-
lations converge to the same paths. It illustrates the fact that reinsurers target an optimal level of capital
that depends on the number of ﬁrms of the market. This convergence is linked to the complete symmetry
of the market, and the fact that there is no entry nor exit of reinsurers. The legend indicates the sum of
all initial wealth.
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Figure 13: Sensitivity analysis for W0
Figure 14 presents the sensitivity analysis for the cost of raising new capital. It mainly impacts the
quantity of capital raised after large shock and the time necessary for the market to recover. It has only a
limited impact on the market other variables.
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Figure 14: Sensitivity analysis for cost of external capital c
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Figure 15 presents the sensitivity analysis for the number of reinsurers sharing the same amount of
capital. It illustrates the oligopoly eﬀect: when reinsurers are fewer, they deliver less capacity to the market
and prices are higher during soft market, the impact of important losses is however slightly equivalent.
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Figure 15: Sensitivity analysis for the number of reinsurers
Figure 16 corresponds to the sensitivity analysis for κ. The lower κ, the more capitalized the industry,
and the lower the market prices.
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Figure 16: Sensitivity analysis for κ
The Figure corresponding to the sensitivity analysis for pilim can be found in Section 7 (Figure 8) .
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